Laura Linderman is the Senior Fellow for Eurasia and Director of Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. She joins us today to discuss how Russia’s war in Ukraine has accelerated political, security, and economic shifts across both the North and South Caucasus.
The Cover Photo / Sergei Supinsky / AFP / Getty
The Ukraine War has dramatically accelerated changes that were already happening in the Caucasus. There is a real debate about whether Russia’s position has fundamentally weakened, or whether Moscow is distracted by the war in Ukraine and making strategic choices about where to focus its efforts.
Russia sent peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh after the 2020 war. After the resumption of fighting in 2023, those peacekeepers did nothing, and many Armenians had to flee. To me, that looks like a huge loss of Russian power. You could argue that Moscow decided Karabakh wasn’t worth it, that it made a strategic decision to let Azerbaijan win rather than get drawn into a conflict. However, the Russian withdrawal hit Armenia hard. In 2019, 93% of Armenians trusted Russia. By 2023, only 31% did. That is a massive shift. Armenia and the Armenian government responded by freezing membership in Russia’s military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO), kicking out Russian border guards, and signing a partnership agreement with the U.S. at the end of 2024.
Although Moscow may seem weak militarily, economically; they do still have formidable intelligence capabilities and potential tools for regime change. This type of power is overlooked from a Western perspective, but not by the countries of the South Caucasus.
The North Caucasus, the part of the Caucasus that is inside Russia, has also been affected. Places like Dagestan and Chechnya are sending disproportionate numbers of soldiers to Ukraine. In Chechnya, Russian control is fragile, because it is often based on personal deals with strongmen and not strong institutions. If you look at the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, the war has given him more power and autonomy, but also exposed him to problems.
The question I would like to see more people talking about is whether we are witnessing a permanent downgrade of Russia’s position, or if it is just temporary because Moscow is distracted by Ukraine. If the war ends, and Russia can refocus its attention on the Caucasus, does everything snap back or have there been fundamental changes that have occurred that can’t be reversed? Russia is still a force that shapes choices across the region, but it is hard being based in the US to really get a perspective of what is happening on the ground.
When we think about the broader region, is the traditional division between the North and South Caucasus still analytically useful, or does the current moment require thinking about the region as a single, interconnected space?
The traditional North-South division is becoming less useful. However, I want to be careful not to overstate the connections between the North, which is still legally a part of Russia, and the South, which consists of three independent countries. That distinction still matters, but misses some important dynamics. Ethnic groups, such as the Lezgins in Russia and Azerbaijan, span the border of both regions. When instability happens in one area, it affects the other part.
Scholars Elder Ismailov and Vladimer Papava have tried to rethink the idea of the North and South Caucasus, creating a framework that divides the region into three parts, instead of two. The furthest South part includes parts of Turkey and Iran, because of shared cultural and historical ties. Ismailov and Papava point out that the traditional division between North and South comes from Russian imperial thinking, and not necessarily how the region works. I think that is what is most important to emphasize about the region, especially for Western scholars, thinking about it as an interconnected space. If Russian control weakens in the North, it affects the South. When power shifts in the South, Moscow has to recalculate how it manages the North. The Great Caucasus mountains are a significant barrier to movement, but people, ideas, and problems do move across them. The Congress of the Peoples in the North Caucasus met at the European Parliament in 2023, bringing together Chechen, Circassian, Dagestani, and Ingush leaders. Ukraine has recognized Chechnya’s government-in-exile as well. All that is to say, connections do exist between the North and South.
For policymakers, especially in the United States and Western Europe, it is vital to understand the whole region. You cannot reduce everything in the South to the North, and vice versa. I would love to see more scholars and policymakers thinking of other ways to conceive of the Caucasus that are not just coming from the Russian imperial framework of North and South.
In the South Caucasus, what do you see as the main drivers between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia’s geopolitical realignments?
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are all responding to different pressures. The common thread they are adjusting to is Russian weakness and uncertain Western support.
Armenia’s shift may be the most dramatic. After the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the country felt abandoned by Russia. We saw the Pashinyan government conclude that the old system of regional alliances did not work. Still, there is a lot of internal pain around losing Karabakh, and historical pain around relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. That makes it difficult for any pivot. Russia’s calculations in this regard are interesting. Moscow does not care about borders or territorial integrity the same way Western powers do. They care about influence, leverage, and keeping states in their orbit. If letting Azerbaijan take Karabakh weakens Armenia’s ties to the West and makes Yerevan desperate for Russian protection, that might be worth more to Russia in the long-term than helping Armenia preserve its territory. U.S. posture towards the region serves as an additional wild card, especially in relation to Armenian issues. The Trump administration just released its National Security Strategy (NSS), which surprised many in its approach to foreign relations. If the Trump administration is perceived as friendly, or at least transactional to Moscow, that may also change their calculations about when and where to push in the region.
Azerbaijan is in a different position, and doing quite well. The Karabakh conflict is over, and they won it based on their own terms. Aliyev does not need to worry about Russia using Karabakh as leverage. They are able to play a useful role in multi-vector foreign policy: keeping normal ties with Russia, continuing deep alliances with Turkey, selling energy to Europe, becoming a key player in the East-West trade route, and becoming a part of the C5+1 with Central Asia. They are confident, and have a lot of options.
To talk about Georgia, Georgia is moving towards authoritarianism. However, the puzzle is that the country is consolidating power and pivoting northward at a time when Russia is arguably weak. Why? Ultimately, this is a domestic struggle that is manifesting in foreign policy orientation. The Georgian Dream government is betting that the West’s commitment is unreliable, and that pivoting in the direction of Russia will allow them to stay in power.
Overall, all of the countries of the South Caucasus are recalculating who they can rely on. The answers are different for each.
How are these geopolitical realignments shaping the economic trajectories of the South Caucasus states, particularly in terms of foreign investment, trade corridors, and regional competitiveness?
The big economic story we see a lot of energy around right now is the Middle Corridor. This is a relatively new trade route in the region. It spans from China, through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, before reaching Georgia and continuing to Europe. As this route avoids both Russia and Iran, it has gained attention from Western countries since the Ukraine War began.
Azerbaijan is positioning itself as a key link in this route. Its location and energy resources have made it attractive for foreign investment. Conversely, Tbilisi has benefitted far less from the Middle Corridor than expected. Railways and ports connecting Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe have traditionally run through Georgian territory. However, Georgia’s current diplomatic isolation and authoritarian turn are moving investors away from investing in Georgia. Discussions surrounding new infrastructure for routes between Armenia and Azerbaijan bypass Georgia entirely. If the peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues to progress, Georgia may be entirely cut out of the construction of new regional transport links. From my experience recently at policy events in the United States, U.S. and European policymakers are already treating Georgia like it does not exist. When you talk about the Middle Corridor, discussions of regional connectivity proceed without mention of Georgia. Georgia needs to pay attention to this development.
Armenia is in the hardest position by far. I think they definitely want to open borders wherever possible to connect with these new trade and transport routes. This requires normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which they are trying hard to do. You can tell how much effort they are putting in, but time is not on their side. I would like to see some acceleration for the peace process to be solidified, and for Armenia to benefit economically from the potential of the Middle Corridor.
New trade routes may bring prosperity, but regional political dynamics are creating winners and losers. Azerbaijan is winning. Armenia could become a winner, and they are trying to position themselves to do so. Georgia risks becoming irrelevant.
With Russian influence in the South Caucasus waning, are any new regional powers rising to take its place?
Turkey has certainly gained influence. Turkish drones and military support were decisive in Azerbaijan winning the 2023 Karabakh War. Ankara sees its connection with Azerbaijan as a key part of connecting the broader Turkic world. As a result, Turkey fills some of the vacuum Russia left, providing security guarantees or assistance where Russia traditionally would. In regard to the situation between Turkey and Armenia, Turkey believes any normalization with Armenia has to be on its terms. They may also be thinking about terms of normalization with Armenia in relation to what is acceptable to Azerbaijan. However, Turkey does have limitations. Its influence is strongest in Azerbaijan, and much weaker and uncertain Armenia and Georgia. They are filling particular niches, but not replacing Russia completely.
As a point of comparison, it is important to look at where else Russia has pulled back in Eurasia. In Central Asia, Russia’s distraction has created space for middle powers like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to emerge and pursue more independent foreign policies. From the Washington standpoint, the old framework of treating Central Asia as pawns in great power competition is outdated. The West often thinks that it can step into areas where there is reduced Russian influence. However, in the Central Asia rush, Western engagement has been more limited. Instead, we see regional states becoming the ones to build the Middle Corridor themselves.
Compared to Turkey’s rise, Iran is on the defensive. They are worried about Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli alignment. The TRIPP corridor development, as being facilitated by the U.S., is particularly sensitive. Iran does not have the economic strength Turkey has. They may try to have a regional influence, but are not succeeding to the same level. China is also present in the region, but differently. It invests primarily in infrastructure and digital technology, especially in Georgia and Azerbaijan. They want to expand development through the Belt and Road Initiative, but are not trying to replace Russia as a regional security guarantor.
Finally, we see increased influence from the West, particularly through the TRIPP corridor. However, Western influence is limited by geography, lack of security guarantees, and perception in the region that Western attention comes and goes.
With shifting alliances in the South Caucasus and Russian strategic retreat across much of Eurasia, what does this mean for Russia’s ability to manage political stability in the North Caucasus?
If we look at Russia historically, they have often used positions of power in the South Caucasus to influence the North Caucasus. Russia has and is continuing to control the North Caucasus right now through heavy security, presidential pressure, federal subsidies, and personal deals with strongmen like Kadyrov. All of these ties are now under pressure due to the Ukraine War.
If we look specifically at the Kadyrov arrangement, that is particularly problematic for Russia, as it is based on a very personal relationship between Putin and Kadyrov. Putin gave Kadyrov significant autonomy in exchange for loyalty. Kadyrov as a result has developed his own militia and implemented his own religious laws, which sometimes contradict Moscow. This has created a precedent which may cause other North Caucasian regions to ask why Chechnya gets this special arrangement.
Additionally, Russia’s retreat or weakness to the South could signal potential weakness to North Caucasusian populations. While the North Caucasus does have its own distinct dynamics, which are often driven by local factors, what happens in say, Armenia or Georgia or Azerbaijan, definitely matters to the North.
What are the most realistic risks and opportunities created by the possibility of greater autonomy or political assertiveness emerging among the North Caucasian republics?
I want to make a statement that may not necessarily be popular with US or Western European policymakers. Independence for parts of the North Caucasus is not just a risk. It is also an option with historical precedence. It is not necessarily likely, but one we need to think about regardless.
Chechnya was de facto independent from 1996-1999. It had its own government, security forces, and international relations. Putin’s war to retake it was brutal. Earlier on, from 1918-1922, there was the Mountainous Republic of the North Caucasus. Even today, growing movements within Russia, where local groups discuss independence and self-determination, exist. Scholars like Janusz Bugajski at the Jamestown Foundation has made a very strong case for Russian decolonization, arguing that Russia is essentially still a colonial empire that should be decolonized. The risks to this are real, but I do think not enough folks engage with that potential in policy discussions as much as they should. The region’s ethnic diversity could create conflicts. Existent elite power struggles could turn violent, as we have already seen. However, there are opportunities this could bring as well. A more autonomous North Caucasus could pursue its own governments, governance, and reform to fight corruption, developing economics that serve their own populations rather than enriching Russian-backed strongmen.
The current system in Chechnya, where Kadyrov rules Chechnya like his own personal fiefdom, is not sustainable. This discussion may be uncomfortable for Western policymakers, but we do need to be honest that the possibility of it coming to an end is real. There is of course the question of whether this change in the region happens through violent collapse or negotiated transition, or even whether the West supports self-determination for peoples inside Russia the same way we support it for Ukraine.
As the war in Ukraine eventually comes to an end, what forms of Western engagement would most effectively support the region’s move away from dependency on Russia?
Chiefly, Western engagement needs to be consistent and tailored to each country in the South Caucasus. Past mistakes came from inconsistent attention that left space for authoritarian backsliding.
Right now, there is a real window to connect with Armenia in particular. Yerevan is actively seeking alternatives to Russia. Pashinyan has taken political risks, but the 2026 parliamentary elections will show if his pivot succeeds. If the government cannot demonstrate that Western engagement has improved Armenia’s economy or security, I think we will see pro-Russian, pro-opposition forces potentially gaining ground. Overall, Armenia needs more support for its defense capacity, economic diversity, and connection to the Middle Corridor. They need to build regional connections, which they do not have as of now, and build improved economic prospects for the Armenian people.
For Azerbaijan, the calculus is different. Baku has resources. They have Turkey’s support, but Western engagement is still necessary to encourage genuine peace with Armenia. The West can show Azerbaijan how to better use its power, and press on governance and human rights issues. Azerbaijan does care about international legitimacy, as we saw during COP 29, and responds to this kind of pressure.
Georgia will be the most difficult to respond to. The U.S. and Europe still do not know what they want their approach to Georgia to be. I think they need to confront their question of what it is they can actually offer to Georgia. They are not offering security guarantees. Economic aid recently has been modest, and even more reduced with the U.S. getting rid of soft power options like USAID. Going forward, Western engagement needs to include more investment in civil society, independent media, and democratic institutions. As it will be necessary in the case of Georgia going forward, even when governments move in difficult directions, maintaining connections with their civil societies can preserve future options.
Across the region, a key change I would like to see is Western engagement that is strategic and sustained, not just crisis-driven. Western engagement can address connectivity as an economic and strategic priority, and present alternatives to Russian dependency in concrete ways. This can take place through avenues like the Middle Corridor, energy diversification, and infrastructure investment. If we look back earlier in history, connections among countries in the South Caucasus and even into Central Asia were connected by the Silk Road. This did get disrupted during the Soviet period, when roads were rerouted to Moscow. Now is the time for some of those connections to come back between the countries in the South Caucasus. From the South Caucasus to Central Asia, there is real opportunity now for cross-Caspian collaboration and economic improvement.
Contributing analysis on Black Sea–Caucasus regional geopolitics and security issues.
